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JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL ANTITRUST CASES. By The Ameri-
can Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law. New York: Record 
Press. 1965. Pp. xvi, 537. $9.75. 
This is a most useful compilation of instructions given by thirty-
one federal judges in thirty-three different criminal antitrust suits 
in nventy-two different districts of the United States courts during 
the period 1923-1964, commencing with United States v. Trenton 
Potteries Co.1 It has been prepared by a committee under the 
direction of Victor H. Kramer, former Chief of the Civil Litigation 
Section of the Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, who is now 
practicing in Washington, D.C. He has had the assistance of a dozen 
other lawyers working in the field, and the result is a valuable hand-
book indeed. 
As the editors explain in their introduction, the volume contains 
about half of the jury charges given in Sherman Act criminal cases 
since 1923. Careful editing has pruned away most repetition. The 
editors have inserted within the charges explanatory captions keyed 
to an index of legal categories, and have supplied separate tables 
classifying the cases by subject-matter and commodity, the names of 
the judges presiding, and the respective judicial districts. The can-
ons for selection from the available material, where alternatives ex-
isted, were clarity, succinctness, and most recent date (as evidenced 
by Judge Van Dusen's charge in United States v. Johns-Manville 
Co.2 The editors have also included charges which contain the only 
available instruction on a particular substantive question of anti-
trust law. 
The volume thus contains for antitrust lawyers the. best collec-
tion of pronouncements from judge to jury on the substantive law 
that must instruct and contain the jury's deliberations. The instruc-
tions are clothed in the common sense, work-a-day terms necessary for 
what Judge Frank called jury-made law, as contrasted with judge-
made law.8 From the point of view of the concepts which lurk in 
their verbiage, the instructions are spongy and intractable material, 
but that is the price one must·pay for the jury trial protected by the 
seventh amendment. Balzac, who was not acquainted with the Bill 
of Rights, looked on the jury as "nvelve men chosen to decide who 
has the better lawyer." However, in many criminal antitrust cases a 
jury may be the only common-sense safeguard of the rights of busi-
nessmen caught in the Byzantine complexities of the Sherman, Clay-
ton, and Robinson-Patman laws, with their innumerable decisional 
glosses. It is an unsatisfactory method, as Judge Frank pointed out;4 
I. Cr. No. 32-566, S.D.N.Y. 1922. 
2. Cr. No. 21-118, E.D. Pa. 1962. 
3. FRANK, I.Aw AND nm MODERN MIND 174 (1930). 
4. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 108-25 (1949). 
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yet for needless and wrongly motivated prosecutions, the grand jury 
may be an ineffective screen, leaving the petit jury as the only pro-
tection of the citizen. 
The difficulty of the method is illustrated in this book. For in-
stance, the dominating concept of "reasonable doubt" is not very 
satisfactorily defined, the best treatment being that in United States 
v. American Tobacco Co.,5 in which Judge Ford spoke in terms of 
"an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge 
under consideration."6 Some may think this an overstatement. Apart 
from the comic definition of the term "reasonable doubt" as "any 
doubt that is reasonable" (which one does sometimes find), I have 
wondered why it is so hard to make clear to laymen the exact nature 
of the concept, and why so many judges find it necessary to define the 
phrase in its own terms. The Supreme Court remarked in Miles v. 
United States1 that attempts to explain "reasonable doubt" do not 
usually result in making it any clearer to the jury; surely it should 
be possible to say that a reasonable doubt is an uncertainty or ques-
tion that survives the application of rational analysis to the evidence. 
Yet perhaps these terms suffer from being more complicated than the 
words defined-like Sir Thomas Browne's translation of festina 
lente as "celerity contempered with cunctation." 
It is gratifying to find Judge Lindley expressing the view that aid 
to the jury can be given more efficiently by an oral charge which de-
scribes the legal questions involved "in as simple terms as possible,"8 
avoiding legal terminology. In instructions to the jury, simplicity 
and articulation are the two cardinal points. Vagueness and iµisun-
derstanding arise as much from lack of clear and articulate structure 
in the charge as from verbosity and complexity. For instance, the fol-
lowing colloquy at the end of a long charge can only have left the 
jury mystified: 
Mr. Rothbard: I ask your Honor to say to the jury that if 
the jury find the defendants Delta Fish Company and Busky 
participated under such circumstances as to furnish reasonable 
grounds for apprehending a design to do bodily harm or cause 
substantial economic loss, and that there was reasonable ground 
for b.elieving the danger imminent and that such design would 
be accomplished, they must be acquitted. 
The Court: I have given that in substance, except only your 
limitation that if they went into it is not correct. 
Mr. Rothbard: I did not say that. I said participated. 
The Court: If they participated at any time, no. If they parti-
5. Cr. No. 6670, E.D. Ky. 1940. 
6. SECTION OF .ANrrrn.usr LAW, AMERICAN .BAR Ass'N, JURY INsrRUCTIONS JN CRJl\llNAL 
ANTJTRUsr CASES 164 (1965) (hereinafter cited as JURY INsrRUCTIONS). 
7. 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880). 
8. JURY !NsrRUCTJONS 128-29. 
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cipated from beginning to end under those circumstances. 
Mr. Rothbard: That is what I meant. ' 
The Court: Then they are not guilty, but if at any time their 
participation continued without those circumstances, it is a 
different situation. 9 
The only hope of a jury so instructed is to be allowed to take a 
·written copy of the instructions with them to the jury room, as 
Judge Eschb~ch permitted in United States v. Standard Oil Co. 
(Ind.),10 and as Judge Caffrey in Massachusetts did with a civil anti-
trust case. But other judges, like Judge Van Dusen in the Johns-
Manville case, are disinclined to follow this practice, believing that 
it would tend to distract the jury's deliberations into the semantics 
of the judge's particular phraseology and destroy the Olympian per-
spective of the entire case which their collective memory is supposed 
to furnish. 
This last is the greatest delusion of the whole business, and yet-
so hard is our predicament-the jury system does offer the best safe-
guard against abuses in antitrust enforcement through the criminal 
law. For the better operation of that system this manual of instruc-
tions is an excellent tool. 
Ralph M. Carson, 
Member of The New York Bar 
9. Id. at 61-62. 
10. Id. at 437, quoting the charge to the jury in United States v. Standard Oil Co. 
(Ind.), Cr. No. 2199, N.D. Ind. 1958. 
